A Solution to Two Paradoxes of International Capital Flows by Jiandong Ju & Shang-Jin Wei
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We are grateful to Christian Broda, Jingqing Chai, Fabio Ghironi, Piere-Olivier Gourinchas, Kevin
Grier, Kala Krishna, Maurice Obstfeld, Arvind Panagariya, Romain Rancier, Kenneth Rogoff and
seminar/conference participants at the NBER Summer Institute, the Econometric Society Far Eastern
Meeting, IMF, Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and University of Maryland for
helpful discussions. All remaining errors are our own.  The views expressed herein are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2006 by Jiandong Ju and Shang-Jin Wei. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.A Solution to Two Paradoxes of International Capital Flows
Jiandong Ju and Shang-Jin Wei




International capital flows from rich to poor countries can be regarded as either too small (the Lucas
paradox in a one-sector model) or too large (when compared with the logic of factor price equalization
in a two-sector model). To resolve the paradoxes, we introduce a non-neo-classical model which features
financial contracts and firm heterogeneity. In our model, free trade in goods does not imply equal returns
to capital across countries. In addition, rich patterns of gross capital flows emerge as a function of
financial and property rights institutions. A poor country with an inefficient financial system may simultaneously
experience an outflow of financial capital but an inflow of FDI, resulting in a small net flow. In comparison,
a country with a low capital-to-labor ratio but a high risk of expropriation may experience outflow













The paper has two objectives. First, it proposes a model with an aim to resolve
two opposing paradoxes regarding international capital ￿ ows. Second, it provides a
framework to study the role of ￿nancial and property rights institutions in determining
patterns of capital ￿ ows. In particular, it suggests a novel explanation for two-way
capital ￿ ows (simultaneous out￿ ows and in￿ ows of capital) one observes for some
countries: to bypass the ine¢ cient ￿nancial systems in these countries that otherwise
have low capital-to-labor ratios.
While cross-border capital ￿ ows worldwide have risen substantially, reaching
nearly $6 trillion in 2004, less than 10 percent of them go to developing countries.
Lucas (1990) famously pointed out that, relative to the implied di⁄erence in the
marginal returns to capital between rich and poor countries in a one-sector model,
it is a paradox that not more capital goes from rich to poor countries (the paradox
of too small ￿ ows). The Lucas paradox could be turned on its head in a two-sector,
two-factor, neoclassical trade model. A well-known result in such a model is factor
price equalization (FPE): with free trade in goods, returns to factors are equalized
between countries even without factor mobility. In other words, a small friction
to capital mobility can completely stop cross border capital ￿ ows. Given this, any
amount of observed capital ￿ows is excessive (the paradox of too large capital ￿ ows).
A number of solutions to the Lucas paradox have been proposed in the literature.
We will argue that most such explanations cannot escape from the tyranny of the
FPE when generalized to a two-sector, two-factor model. Similarly, while a number
of reasons have been proposed to explain why FPE does not hold, we will argue that
most do not simultaneously resolve the Lucas paradox.
We argue that it is useful to think outside the neoclassical box and propose
a new micro-founded theory to understand goods trade and factor mobility. We
introduce a ￿nancial contract model following Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and
1heterogeneous ￿rms into the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework. A key feature
of the new theory is that the return to ￿nancial investment is generally not the same
as the return to physical investment. Financial investors (or savers) obtain only a
slice of the return to physical capital, as they have to share the return to capital with
entrepreneurs. The more developed a ￿nancial system is, the greater the slice that
goes to the investors. As an implication, a poor country with an ine¢ cient ￿nancial
sector may experience a large out￿ ow of ￿nancial capital, but together with inward
foreign direct investment (FDI), resulting in a small net in￿ ow. Besides ￿nancial
development, our model also incorporates property rights protection as another
institution. Countries with poor property rights protection (high expropriation risk)
may very well experience an out￿ ow of ￿nancial capital without a compensating
in￿ ow of FDI.
To break FPE, one needs to show that factor prices are determined by variables
in addition to product prices. One way to do it is to assume that the production
function is decreasing return to scale (DRS) (e.g., Kraay and others, 2005; and
Wynne, 2005). While this assumption may be appropriate in the short run, it is
hard to explain why ￿rms cannot adjust their factor usage in the long run. In our
model, we retain constant returns to scale at the ￿rm level but endogenously generate
decreasing returns to scale at a sector level. Speci￿cally, entrepreneurs are assumed
to be heterogeneous in their ability to manage capital. As a sector expands, more
entrepreneurs enter and the ability of the marginal entrepreneur declines and so does
the return to investment at the sector level. Although free trade in goods equalizes
product prices, factor returns remain di⁄erent across countries. Other things equal,
the interest rate is lower and the wage rate is higher in the capital-abundant country.
In other words, our two-sector model restores these results from a typical one-sector
model (but still predicts a small net capital ￿ ow between rich and poor countries).
While many papers in the literature have emphasized risk sharing as a motive
for international capital ￿ ow, our model deliberately avoids this by assuming that
2all entrepreneurs and ￿nancial investors are risk-neutral. Adding risk-sharing would
enrich patterns of capital ￿ ow but would not likely undo the basic mechanisms in
this model. Even without a risk sharing motive, our model can generate two-way
gross capital ￿ ows. For example, considering the case in which the expropriation risk
is identical across countries, entrepreneurs are perfectly mobile, but ￿nancial sector
e¢ ciency is uneven across countries, the paper shows that the unique equilibrium
in the world capital market is one in which the less developed ￿nancial system is
completely bypassed by ￿nancial investors and entrepreneurs. The country with the
less developed ￿nancial system may experience a complete exodus of its savings in
the form of ￿nancial capital out￿ ow to the country with a better ￿nancial system,
but see in￿ ow of FDI from the other country.
While the literature sometimes lumps together various types of institutions,
￿nancial and property rights institutions play very di⁄erent roles in this model.
Whereas an ine¢ cient ￿nancial system can be bypassed, high expropriation risk
cannot be. Indeed, if risk of expropriation di⁄ers across countries, there may not be
a complete bypass of the ine¢ cient ￿nancial system either. Financial capital still
leaves the country with an ine¢ cient ￿nancial system, but FDI may be deterred by
a high expropriation risk in spite of a low labor cost in the country. In equilibrium,
we show that the wage rate is always higher in the country with better ￿nancial or
property rights institutions, irrespective of the country￿ s initial endowment.
This paper is related to the theoretical literature that investigates the e⁄ects on
capital ￿ ows of ￿nancial market imperfection. Gertler and Rogo⁄ (1990) show that
a moral hazard problem between foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs may
cause capital ￿ ow from poor to rich countries. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) develop
a model with asymmetric information between countries that explains possible
di⁄erences in the real interest rates. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) show that a
country with better investor protection has a higher interest rate. Matsuyama (2004,
2005) and Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006) study the e⁄ect of credit market
3constraint on capital ￿ ows. Stulz (2005) develops a model of agency problems of
government and entrepreneurs that limit ￿nancial globalization. Caballero, Farhi,
and Gourinchas (2005) show that lower capacity to generate ￿nancial assets reduces
the interest rate. Our theory di⁄ers from these papers in three ways. First, all of
the above papers use a one-sector model, whose prediction on capital ￿ ows does not
generally survive an extension to a two-sector, two-factor model. Second, our model
endogenously generates two-way gross capital ￿ ows with a small net ￿ ow.1 Third,
our model is the ￿rst in the literature that studies possible contrasting e⁄ects of
￿nancial development and expropriation risk on capital ￿ ow.
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1997, p 438) and Ventura (1997) have already pointed out
that the sensitivity of the interest rate to the capital-labor ratio is a special feature
of the one-sector model. They do not, however, develop a new two-sector model
that breaks the factor price equalization, and therefore, do not explain why some
capital would ￿ ow internationally in a multi-sector model.
Our model features heterogeneous entrepreneurs, which is somewhat related to
the models of heterogeneous ￿rms in the international trade literature. Melitz (2003)
develops a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous ￿rms. Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2005) incorporate ￿rm heterogeneity and product variety
into an HO framework and maintain the factor price equalization. Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) study trade and macroeconomic dynamics with heterogeneous ￿rms.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the ￿rst that studies the e⁄ect of
￿rm (entrepreneur) heterogeneity on international capital ￿ ows in a two-sector,
two-factor framework.2
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the two paradoxes
1Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2005) have as an extension of the model that includes
multiple sectors. Their purpose is to study the e⁄ect of exchange rate adjustment. Factor allocation
across sectors and therefore possible factor price equalization across countries are not studied in
their paper. While they also allow for two-way gross ￿ ows, its micro-foundation, however, is not
developed.
2Firms￿entry and exit are studied in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). Interpreting a new ￿rm as one
unit of capital, Ghironi and Melitz (2005) model can be extended to international capital ￿ ows.
4of capital ￿ ows within the con￿ne of a neoclassical framework, though a detailed
discussion of the literature is relegated to Appendix A. Section 3 sets up our model.
Sections 4 and 5 study the aggregation and equilibrium conditions, and some key
comparative statics, respectively. Section 6 analyzes di⁄erent forms of international
capital ￿ ow under free trade in goods. Section 7 concludes. Appendix B provides
the formal proofs for the propositions in the text and a table of the notations, and
a set of ￿gures.
2 Paradoxes of International Capital Flows
In this section we examine return to capital in standard neoclassical models. The
production functions generate constant returns to scale, and ￿rms are perfectly
competitive. We begin with a one-sector model before moving to a two-sector model.
2.1 The Lucas Paradox of Too Small Capital Flows
Using a one-sector model, Lucas (1990) suggested that it was a paradox that more
capital does not ￿ ow from rich to poor countries. His reasoning goes as follows. Let
y = f(L;K) be the production function where y is the output produced using labor
L and capital K: Let p be the price of goods, and w and r be returns to labor and
capital, respectively. Firm￿ s pro￿t maximization problem gives
r = p@f(L;K)=@K = p@f(1;K=L)=@K (1)
With free trade, the price of goods is equalized across countries. The Law of
Diminishing Marginal Product implies that r is higher in the country with lower
per capita capital. As an illustration, Lucas calculated that the return to capital
in India should be 58 times as high as that in the United States. Facing a return
di⁄erential of this magnitude, Lucas argued, we should observe massive capital ￿ ows
from rich to poor countries. That it does not happen has come to be known as the
5Lucas paradox.
2.2 The Opposite Paradox of Too Large Capital Flows
The logic of the Lucas paradox can be turned on its head in a multi-sector model.
Speci￿cally, in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson two goods, two factors, and
two countries model, ￿rms earn zero pro￿t. So we must have:
p1 = c1(w;r) and p2 = c2(w;r) (2)
where c(:) is the unit cost function and subscripts represent sectors. Comparing to
the one-sector model, now
r = pi@fi(1;Ki=Li)=@K = pi@fi(1;aiK=aiL)=@K; for i = 1;2 (3)
where aiK=aiL =
@ci(w;r)=@r
@ci(w;r)=@w is capital-labor ratio per unit of production. For given
product prices, the wage rate w and the interest rate r; and therefore aiK=aiL; are
determined and independent from factor endowments L and K￿ the well-known
￿factor price insensitivity￿(Leamer, 1995). Increases in K change the composition
of outputs: more capital-intensive goods and less labor-intensive goods, will be
produced, but the marginal return to physical capital in each sector stays unchanged.
Free trade equalizes product prices, and therefore equalizes the return to factors
across countries, even in the absence of international factor movements. This result
was ￿rst proved by Samuelson (1948, 1949) and has come to be known as the ￿Factor
Price Equalization Theorem (FPE).￿ Countries indirectly export their abundant
factors through trade in goods. The capital ￿ ow is completely substituted by goods
trade. There is no incentive for any amount of capital to ￿ ow between countries once
there is free trade in goods.
One might think that the assumptions needed for FPE are surely too restrictive
to be realistic and are not likely to hold once one goes beyond the 2 ￿ 2 ￿ 2
6model. Deardo⁄ (1994) derives a necessary condition of the FPE, known as the
￿lens condition￿in a n goods, m factors, and H countries model. The condition has
also been proved to be su¢ cient in a model of n goods, 2 factors, and H countries by
Xiang (2001).3 In Appendix A, we o⁄er an intuitive version of su¢ cient condition of
FPE, labelled as ￿chain rule of FPE￿ . As we will see, such a condition is relatively
weak.
A number of solutions to the Lucas paradox have been proposed in the literature:
(i) thinking of a worker in a rich country as e⁄ectively equivalent to multiple workers
in a poor country, (ii) adding human capital as a new factor of production, and
(iii) allowing for sovereign risk. We will argue in Appendix A that none of these
explanations can escape from the tyranny of the FPE. On the other hand, while the
FPE can be relaxed in a number of ways, we argue in Appendix A that very few of
them imply a pattern of capital ￿ ows that resolves the Lucas paradox.
Both the Lucas paradox and FPE rely on the assumption that marginal product
of physical capital determines capital ￿ ow.4 In general, however, the return to
￿nancial investment and the return to physical capital do not have to be the same.
By introducing a ￿nancial contract between entrepreneurs and investors, together
with heterogeneous ￿rms into the HOS framework, our model predicts that the
interest rate is determined by both factor endowments and institutions, while the
wage rate is higher in the country with a more e¢ cient ￿nancial system or better
property rights protection.
3 The Model
The model embeds two non-neo-classical twists in an otherwise standard neo-classical
two-sector, two-factor, and two-country setup. The two twists are ￿nancial contracts
3For a recent discussion on the lens condition and additional literature review, readers are
guided to Bernard, Robertson and Schott (2004).
4This view is common in the literature. In models without risk, Ventura (2003, p. 488) states
that the rule is: ￿invest your wealth in domestic capital until its marginal product equals the world
interest rate.￿
7between investors and entrepreneurs a la Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), and entrepreneurs￿
heterogeneity.
3.1 Basic Setup
We start from a single country economy. To capture the idea that ￿rms generally
need outside ￿nancing, we assume that each entrepreneur is endowed with one unit
of capital but has to raise the rest of the funds from other investors. The ￿nal output
depends in part on the entrepreneur￿ s level of e⁄ort, which is not observable by the
investors. Due to this moral hazard problem, a portion of the revenue per unit of
investment must be paid to the entrepreneur to induce her e⁄ort. The production
process is assumed to take two periods. After an initial investment, a stochastic
liquidity shock hits in the form of an additional amount of resource required for
the ￿rm to continue to operate. In an optimal ￿nancial contract, the entrepreneur
maximizes the net return to her capital endowment by choosing an amount of initial
investment, a project continuation rule for every realization of the liquidity shock,
and a compensation to the entrepreneur that would induce her to exert a high level
of e⁄ort.
Let each ￿rm have a stochastic technology. The ￿rst period production function
of industry i is y1
i = Gi(L1
i;K1
i ) (i = 1;2), where the superscript 1 denotes date 1.
The labor-capital ratio, L1
i=K1
i ; is assumed to be ￿xed and denoted by ai: The wage
rate and the interest rate are denoted by w and r, respectively.
The timing of events is described in Figure 1. There are K amount of capitalists
in the economy. Each capitalist is assumed to be born with 1 unit of capital and an
index n, which determines her cost of e⁄ort and is observable. She can choose to
become either an entrepreneur or a ￿nancial investor at the the beginning of date 1:
If she chooses to be an entrepreneur, she would manage one project, investing her
1 unit of capital (labeled as internal capital) and raising KX1
ni amount of external
capital from ￿nancial investors. The total initial investment in the ￿rm is the sum
8of internal and external capital, or K1
ni = 1 + KX1
ni , which is injected to the ￿rm
at date 1. Correspondingly, aiK1
ni amount of labor is hired. At the beginning of
date 2; a liquidity shock occurs. An additional and uncertain amount ￿iK1
ni > 0 of
￿nancing is needed to cover operating expenditures and other needs. The liquidity
shock per unit of capital, ￿i, is distributed according to a cumulative distribution
function Fi(￿) with a density function fi(￿): The ￿rm (entrepreneur) then makes
a decision on whether to continue or abandon the project. If ￿iK1
ni is paid, the
project continues and output Gi(ai;1)K1
ni will be produced at the end of date 2. In
the process, ai￿iK1
ni amount of additional labor is hired, which is paid as a part of the
additional ￿nancing.5 If ￿iK1
ni is not paid, however, the project is terminated and
yields no output. The failed projects are then liquidated and factors are reallocated.
Investment in the ￿rm is subject to a moral hazard problem. The utility for
entrepreneur n ￿ 1 of managing one unit of capital in sector i is de￿ned as
Vni(e) = ￿i(e)RE
ni ￿ cni(e) (4)
where e denotes the level of e⁄ort which takes a binary value of either high, eH
(work), or low, eL (shirk). RE
ni is what the entrepreneur gets from managing one
unit of capital if the project succeeds. If the entrepreneur works, the probability of
success is ￿i(eH); if she shirks, the probability of success is ￿i(eL). For simplicity, the
probability of success is assumed to be identical across all entrepreneurs. However,
the cost of ￿work￿ , cni(eH), is heterogeneous across entrepreneurs. We normalize the
cost of ￿shirk￿to zero. Furthermore, in subsequent discussion, we assume ￿1(eH) =
￿2(eH) = ￿ and normalize ￿i(eL) = 0:
The ￿rm is run by the entrepreneur who owns a part of the ￿rm. In the absence
of proper incentives, the entrepreneur may deliberately reduce the e⁄ort level in
order to reduce the e⁄ort cost. The entrepreneur makes a decision on the e⁄ort
5￿i consists of additional capital and labor expenditure per unit of initial investment. The
capital unit is chosen so that aiw < 1:The assumption is made to simplify the subsequent algebra.
9level after the continuation decision is made at date 2. The labor is paid at w in the
second period if the project succeeds and zero if it fails. Consumption takes place
at the end of the second period.
The total return to one unit of initial capital if the project succeeds, Ri; is
determined by ￿rm￿ s zero pro￿t condition
piy1
i ￿ wL1
i = [piGi(ai;1) ￿ wai]K1
i = RiK1
i (5)
On date 2; the ￿rst period investment K1
i is sunk. The net present value of the
investment is maximized by continuing the project whenever the expected return
from continuation, ￿Ri; exceeds the cost ￿i; that is, ￿Ri ￿ ￿i ￿ 0: Let
￿1
i = ￿Ri (6)
be the ￿rst-best cuto⁄ value of ￿i. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), we assume
that the project￿ s net present value is positive if the entrepreneur works; but negative
if she shirks. Therefore, we only need to consider those contracts that implement a
high level of e⁄ort.
One institutional feature emphasized in this model is property rights protection,
or control of the risk of expropriation. An emerging literature has suggested that
cross-country di⁄erences in property rights protection are a major determinant of
cross-country di⁄erences in long-run economic growth and patterns of international
capital ￿ ow (see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; and Alfaro,
Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2005). One could conveniently think of a higher
value of ￿ in our model as representing better property rights protection (or lower
expropriation risk). Equivalently, a higher value of ￿ also represents a lower tax rate
on capital return.
103.2 Financial Contracts
The entrepreneur n and ￿nancial investors sign a contract at the beginning of date
1; which speci￿es the total amount of investment, her plan on whether to continue or
terminate the project for every realization of the liquidity shock, and how the ￿nal
project return is going to be divided between the ￿nancial investors and herself.
More precisely, let Cni = fK1
ni;￿ni(￿i);RE
ni(￿i)g be the ￿nancial contract, where
￿ni(￿i) is a state-contingent policy on project continuation (1 = continue; 0 = stop),
and RE
ni(￿i) is the entrepreneur￿ s portion of the revenue per unit of investment. For
every dollar of investment, investors are left with Ri ￿ RE
ni(￿i). If the project is
terminated, both sides are assumed to receive zero.
An optimal contract can be found by choosing fK1
ni;￿ni(￿i);RE
ni(￿i)g to solve
























ni(￿i) ￿ cni(eH) ￿ 0 (9)
Expression (7) is the present value of the ￿rm￿ s net return to internal capital. (8)
is the participation constraint for outside investors, while (9) is the entrepreneur￿ s
incentive compatibility constraint.
Solving the above problem, the optimal continuation policy ￿ni(b ￿ni) takes the
form of a cuto⁄ rule so that the project continues, or ￿ni(￿i) = 1 if ￿i ￿ b ￿ni, and
terminates, or ￿ni(￿i) = 0 if ￿i > b ￿ni: As is shown in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),






















ni = ￿[Ri ￿ RE
ni(￿i)] = ￿Ri ￿ cni(eH) (12)
Substituting binding constraints (8) into (7), the ￿rm￿ s net return to internal
capital becomes
Uni(b ￿ni) =
￿Ri ￿ h(b ￿ni)










hi(b ￿ni); in the terminology of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), is expected unit cost
of total investment, which is the opportunity cost of initial investment at date 1;
(1 + r); plus the expected ￿nancing for the liquidity shock at date 2,
R b ￿ni
0 ￿ifi(￿i)d￿i;
under the condition that the project continues. Maximizing Uni(b ￿ni) is equivalent





Fi(￿i)d￿i = 1 + r (15)
￿
opt
ni gives the second-best solution to the project cuto⁄point in response to liquidity
shocks. Note that equation (15) implies that ￿
opt
ni is independent of n: Thus all




i : Equation (15)
shows ￿
opt
i increases as r increases. Intuitively, as the interest rate increases, the
12opportunity cost of the investment becomes higher. To attract investors to the
project, the ￿rm needs to promise a higher probability that the project will continue
in the face of a liquidity shock, which implies higher optimal cuto⁄ point ￿
opt
i :
We will assume that f1(￿1) = f2(￿2) = f(￿) has a uniform distribution in [0;￿]
thereafter. Then equation (15) gives the solution of ￿
opt
i = ￿opt as
￿opt = [2(1 + r)￿]
1
2 (16)
We now introduce ￿nancial development into our model. We use ￿ to represent
the level of ￿nancial development of a country. More precisely, we assume only
liquidity shocks b ￿ni ￿ ￿￿
opt
i can be met by the ￿nancial system where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
Higher ￿ represents a more developed ￿nancial system.6 Two interpretations are
possible: either each ￿rm is ￿nanced up to the liquidity shock b ￿ni = ￿￿
opt
i ; or ￿
portion of ￿rms are ￿nanced up to ￿
opt
i and 1 ￿ ￿ portion of ￿rms are not ￿nanced
for any shock.
Let b ￿ni = ￿￿opt: Expression (14) now becomes









It is easy to see that @h=@r > 0 and @h=@￿ < 0:
Let there be a continuum of entrepreneurs (￿rms) in type n with a unit mass.
Fi(￿i) denotes both the ex ante probability of a ￿rm facing a liquidity shock below
￿i; and a realized fraction of ￿rms with liquidity shock below ￿i in sector i: The
total capital usage by type n entrepreneur is the sum of initial investment K1
ni(:)
6￿ may also represent the level of credit constraint, which has been used to represent the level of
￿nancial development by Matsuyama (2004, 2005) and Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006). Other
theoretical indices of ￿nancial development include the level of investor protection by Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002) and the country￿ s capacity of external capital by Ju and Wei (2005).
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R ￿￿opt
0 ￿ifi(￿i)d￿i














which is identical for all entrepreneurs in sector i:
3.3 Allocation of Capital and Market for Entrepreneurs
There are two sectors in the economy. Sector 1 is assumed to be one in which
entrepreneurs￿cost of ￿work￿di⁄ers. We rank entrepreneurs by their costs of work
from low to high, and index them by n directly. Entrepreneur n has lower cost of
work than that of the entrepreneur n0 if n < n0: In other words, the cost of work by
entrepreneur n in sector 1, cn1 = cn1(eH), is an increasing function in n. We will
assume cn1 = c1n for simplicity. Expression (12) gives ￿0
n1 = ￿R1 ￿ c1n; which is
decreasing in n: Expression (13) then implies that the ￿rm￿ s net return to internal
capital in sector 1; Un1(:) is decreasing in n:
In Sector 2, all entrepreneurs are assumed to have the same cost of work. That
is, cn2(eH) = c2. Expression (12) indicates that ￿0
n2 = ￿R2 ￿ c2; which is identical
for all entrepreneurs. Thus, all entrepreneurs have the same pro￿t, U2(:); in sector
2. Let N1 be the number of ￿rms in Sector 1. N1 solves for
UN11 =
￿R1 ￿ h(r;￿)
h(r;￿) ￿ [￿R1 ￿ c1N1]
= U2 (20)
As Figure 2 illustrates, entrepreneurs in the interval of [1;N1] enter Sector 1 and
14earn the net return to internal capital Un1 ￿ U2: Entrepreneurs of n > N1 enter
Sector 2 and earn the net return to internal capital U2:
We assume that a capitalist (a potential entrepreneur) needs to pay a ￿xed entry
cost of f units of the numeraire good at the beginning of the ￿rst period to become
an entrepreneur. The net return to internal capital in Sector 2; U2; should be equal
to f. On the other hand, the marginal entrepreneur in Sector 1, N1; should have
the same net return to internal capital as f; while all other entrepreneurs in Sector
1 earn higher net returns. Using equation (20), the conditions can be stated as
UN11 =
￿R1 ￿ h(r;￿)




h(r;￿) ￿ [￿R2 ￿ c2]
= f (21)
The career choice of a capitalist (between being an entrepreneur and a ￿nancial
investor) is determined by the interest rate r. If the return to investment r increases,
the net return to internal capital in sector 2; U2; declines. Thus, some entrepreneurs
in Sector 2 would exit and become ￿nancial investors.
It is clear from (8) that investors￿expected revenue from the project is larger
as entrepreneur￿ s pay to work, RE
ni, becomes smaller. For a given interest rate r;
that means date 1 investment K1
ni is larger. Expression (18) then implies that
total capital managed by the entrepreneur in Sector 1 is larger for more productive
managers (smaller n). We summarize our results by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 As the interest rate increases, fewer capitalists choose to become entrepreneurs
at the beginning of date 1: Among the entrepreneurs, the more productive ones
enter the heterogeneous sector, while the less productive ones enter the homogeneous
sector. In the heterogeneous sector, the more productive entrepreneurs manage more
capital.
15Note that part of the lemma resembles the results in Shleifer and Wolfenzon￿ s
(2002) one-factor model. In particular, in their model, it is also the case that
fewer capitalists become entrepreneurs when the interest rate increases, and more
productive entrepreneurs manage more capital.
4 Aggregation and Equilibrium Conditions
The ￿rst set of equilibrium conditions are free entry conditions which are summarized
by equations (21). Rewrite them as
￿R1 = h(r;￿) +
fc1N1
1 + f




which we label as capital revenue-sharing conditions. The left hand sides of equations
(22) are expected marginal products of physical capital in two sectors, respectively.
Each is a sum of an expected unit cost of total investment, h(r;￿), and a payment
to the entrepreneurs￿e⁄orts.
The second set of equilibrium conditions comprises full employment conditions.
Each entrepreneur in Sector 2 manages K2(:) amount of capital. Entrepreneur n in
Sector 1 manages Kn1(:) amount of capital. (19) implies that the labor-capital ratio
is identical for all entrepreneurs within a sector. Let the number of entrepreneurs
in Sector 2 be N2: Let L and K be the country￿ s labor and capital endowments,




Kn1(:)dn + a2K2(:)N2 = L (23)
Z N1
1
Kn1(:)dn + K2(:)N2 = K (24)
Substituting (10), (14), and (22) into (18), we obtain
16Kn1(:) =
h(r;￿)
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1 + f ￿ fN1
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a2 (1 + f)h(r;￿)
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We close this section with the market-clearing conditions in product markets.












1 + f ￿ fN1
￿
(29)
where we have used (11), (14) and (22) to derive the second equality. The expected




G2(a2;1)￿(1 + r)(1 + f)N2
c2
(30)
We assume that the representative consumer￿ s preference is homothetic. Thus,
the ratio of the quantities consumed in the country depends only upon the relative
17goods price ratio and can be represented by D(
p1
p2): In equilibrium, the relative














where p = p1=p2: Let good 2 be the numeraire good whose price is normalized to 1
in subsequent sections.
5 Comparative Statics




















The endogenous variables, w; r; p; N1 and N2 are determined by equations (26),
(27), (31), (32), and (33). The outputs y1 and y2 are then derived from expressions
(29) and (30). We will study the e⁄ects of changes in endowments, the level of
￿nancial development, and expropriation risk on equilibrium prices and quantities.
5.1 Determination of Factor Prices
The free entry conditions (32) and (33) are represented by curves zizi(i = 1;2) in
Figure 3. They are convex toward origin and downward sloping in (w;r) space. The
















ai for i = 1;2 (34)
18Assume that a1 < a2; and so Sector 2 is more labor intensive than Sector 1.
As indicated in Figure 3, z2z2; is steeper than z1z1: Let the initial factor price
equilibrium be given by point M: A decrease in the relative price of good 1, or
an increase in N1; will shift z1z1 inward to zk
1zk
1, and move the equilibrium to
point A: It is clear that the wage goes up and the interest rate declines. When ￿ is
increased, both zk
1zk




2. The equilibrium moves from
point A to point B which is vertically above A: The wage rate stays at exactly the
same level, while the interest rate increases. A better ￿nancial system reduces the
expected unit cost of total investment, h(r;￿); and therefore increases the return to
investment. The return to labor, however, is una⁄ected by the ￿nancial development
due to the Leontif technology assumed in our model. As we formally prove in the
Appendix B, under the condition that the highest cost of entrepreneurs￿e⁄ort in
the heterogeneous sector is more than that in the homogeneous sector, the interest
rate increases but the wage rate declines as ￿ increases. Our analysis is similar to
classical Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem, augmented by e⁄ects of entrepreneurs￿
heterogeneity, ￿nancial development and expropriation risk on factor prices. We
summarize the above results by a ￿Stolper-Samuelson plus￿theorem and relegate
the formal proof to Appendix B.
Proposition 1 (Stolper-Samuelson plus) Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the price
of a good decreases the return to the factor used intensively in that good, and
increases the return to the other factor. Furthermore, an increase in the number
of entrepreneurs in the heterogeneous sector decreases the return to the factor used
intensively in that sector and increases the return to the other factor. An improvement
in the level of ￿nancial development increases the interest rate but has no e⁄ect on
the wage rate. If the highest cost of entrepreneurs￿e⁄ort in the heterogeneous sector
is more than that in the homogeneous sector, a lower expropriation risk increases
the interest rate but reduces the wage rate.
19Note that factor price equalization does not hold in our model, making it di⁄erent
from the textbook version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Di⁄erences in ￿ and ￿ make
factor prices di⁄er. Even if ￿ and ￿ are the same across countries, as we show next,
more entrepreneurs enter the heterogeneous sector in the capital-abundant country.
Then the proposition above indicates that a larger N1 results in a lower interest rate
r and a higher wage rate w at the capital-abundant country.
5.2 Changes in Endowment and Institutions
We turn now to the response of outputs (represented by N1 and N2) to changes
in exogenous variables: the Rybczynski (1955) e⁄ect of endowment, augmented by
e⁄ects of ￿nancial development and expropriation risk. Let equations (26) and (27)
be denoted as LL curve and KK curve, respectively. The numbers of entrepreneurs
(or amounts of internal capital) in equilibrium, E = (N1;N2) are determined by the
intersection of the LL and the KK curves, as indicated in Figure 4. KK curve is
steeper than LL curve because Sector 1 is capital-intensive. Totally di⁄erentiating
equations (26) and (27) and using ￿Jones￿algebra (Jones, 1965),￿we obtain
￿1L b N1 + ￿2L b N2 = b L ￿ [￿1Lb a1L + ￿2Lb a2L]
￿1K b N1 + ￿2K b N2 = b K ￿ [￿1Kb a1K + ￿2Kb a2K] (35)
We de￿ne dN1=N1 = b N1; and likewise for all other variables. In addition, we de￿ne
the fraction of labor used in industry i by,
￿1L =







a1L (1 + f)
L(1 + f ￿ fN1)
where ￿1L + ￿2L = 1: We de￿ne ￿iK and ￿1K in an analogous manner.
Let the initial equilibrium output be at point E: The e⁄ect of a change in
20endowment is similar to the standard HOS model. b L and b K represent the direct
e⁄ect of a change in endowment at given product prices, while the second terms on
the right hand side of equations (35) represent the feedback e⁄ect of induced factor
price changes on the factor usage per unit of production. For given factor prices,
as depicted in Figure 4, the direct e⁄ect of an increase in the capital endowment
shifts KK out to K0K0 and moves the equilibrium to point E0. It is clear that N1
goes up, whereas N2 declines. The increase in N1 raises y1, while the decrease in
N2 reduces y2. Thus, the relative price of good 1, p, decreases. By Proposition 1,
both the decrease in p and the increase in N1 reduces r while increasing w. Using
(28), we know that both labor and capital usages per unit of production decrease.
Thus, the feedback e⁄ect shifts the K0K0 curve out further to K00K00 and shifts the
LL curve out to L00L00, which moves the equilibrium from E0 to E00. The shifting
out of KK curve further increases N1 and reduces N2, while the shifting out of LL
curve reduces N1 and increases N2. As we formally prove in the Appendix B, if a
modi￿ed condition for nonreversal of factor intensity is satis￿ed, the overall e⁄ect
of an increase in K=L is to increase N1; while the overall e⁄ect on N2 is ambiguous.
However, the relative price p declines, and as a result, the relative output y1 to y2
increases.
We now discuss the e⁄ect of a change in ￿: As Proposition 1 shows, the increase
in ￿ raises the interest rate r but has no e⁄ect on the wage w. That is, the impact of
changing in ￿ is completely absorbed by the increase of r, while leaving w una⁄ected.
Expression (5) and (22) then indicate that the change in ￿ must be o⁄set by the
change in r so that h(r;￿) stays constant. Using (28), we know that aij must remain
constant as ￿ changes. As a result, N1; N2; and p are not a⁄ected by the increase in
￿: Note that although the increase in ￿ does not a⁄ect the number of entrepreneurs,
it raises y1 and y2 by the same proportion as indicated by expressions (29) and (30).
The increase in ￿ raises the interest rate so that h(r;￿) is higher. Expression
(28) indicates that factor usages per unit of production increases. Thus both, LL
21and KK shift back, and equilibrium moves from E to E000 in Figure 4. N1 and N2
both decline. As we formally prove in the Appendix B, under the condition that
the highest cost of entrepreneur￿ s e⁄ort in the heterogeneous sector is more than
that in the homogeneous sector, N1 and N2 decrease proportionally in the way that
relative price p does not change. Lower expropriation risk reduces the number of
￿rms. Each ￿rm, however, becomes larger and produces more. As we show in the
Appendix B, the positive e⁄ect of ￿ on interest rate r dominates the negative e⁄ect
on Ni; Using (29) and (30), industry outputs y1 and y2 are larger as ￿ increases.
We summarize the above results by a ￿Rybczynski plus￿theorem.
Proposition 2 (Rybczynski plus) Suppose a modi￿ed condition for nonreversal of
factor intensity is satis￿ed, so that sector 1 is always capital-intensive. An increase
in capital endowment will increase the number of entrepreneurs in sector 1, and
decrease the relative price of good 1: Furthermore, an improvement in the level of
￿nancial development will raise the output in both sectors proportionally, leaving
the number of entrepreneurs and the relative product price unchanged. If the highest
cost of entrepreneurs￿ e⁄ort in the heterogeneous sector is more than that in the
homogeneous sector, a lower expropriation risk will raise the output but reduce the
number of entrepreneurs in both sectors proportionally and have no e⁄ect on the
relative product price.
Propositions 1 and 2 together give rise to predictions on how a change in endowment
(or ￿nancial and property rights institution) on factor prices. In particular, an
increase in capital endowment increases N1 and reduces p by Proposition 2. Both
e⁄ects reduce r but increase w by Proposition 1. We can work out in a similar way
the e⁄ects of an increase in ￿ or ￿. For convenience, these results can be summarized
by the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, an increase in the capital-labor ratio reduces the interest
rate but raises the wage rate. An improvement in the ￿nancial system raises the
22interest rate but leaves the wage rate unchanged. A reduction in the expropriation
risk raises the interest rate but reduces the wage rate.
6 Free Trade and Capital Flows
Using the comparative statics results derived above, we are now ready to describe
patterns of goods trade and capital ￿ ows. Consider two countries with identical and
homothetic tastes, identical technologies, identical liquidity shocks and managers￿
behavior, but di⁄erent factor endowments, levels of ￿nancial development, and
expropriation risks. Labor is immobile across countries. After studying free trade
in goods without international capital ￿ ow, we move sequentially by allowing only
￿nancial capital ￿ ow at ￿rst, only foreign direct investment (FDI) next, and both
types of capital ￿ ows simultaneously in the end.
6.1 Free Trade in Goods
Let variables in the foreign country be denoted by a superscript ￿￿￿ . The equilibrium
autarky prices at home and abroad are represented by p and p￿; respectively. p￿
may di⁄er from p if L￿; K￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿ are di⁄erent from corresponding domestic
variables. Comparing p￿ with p is equivalent to the exercise of comparative statics
in the last section that changes K=L, ￿; and ￿ to K￿=L￿, ￿￿ and ￿￿; respectively.
Let b p = (p￿ ￿ p)=p be the percentage di⁄erence in the autarky prices. Ignoring a
second order e⁄ect and using equation (66) in the Appendix, we have
Apb p = b L ￿ b K (37)
where Ap = ￿j￿j￿D=￿N > 0. b L; b K; b ￿ and b ￿ are now percentage di⁄erences
in the labor and capital endowments, ￿nancial development, and risk expropriation
between two countries. Noting that b ￿ and b ￿ have no e⁄ect on relative product prices,
our analysis of goods trade is essentially a generalized Heckscher-Ohlin model in an
23environment of imperfect capital market and heterogeneous entrepreneurs.
Proposition 3 Suppose capital ￿ow is prohibited. In this model with ￿nancial
market imperfection and heterogeneous entrepreneurs, the Heckscher-Ohlin result
on trade patterns still holds: each country produces and exports the good that uses
its relatively abundant factor intensively.
6.2 Financial Capital Flows
We now turn to capital ￿ ows under the equilibrium of free trade in goods. There are
two types of international capital ￿ ows: ￿nancial capital ￿ ows decided by ￿nancial
investors and FDI decided by entrepreneurs. International ￿nancial ￿ ows occur
when the investor invests her endowment in a foreign ￿nancial market (or directly
in a foreign entrepreneur￿ s project). On the other hand, FDI occurs when the
entrepreneur takes her project to the foreign country and produces there. Investors
will invest in the country with a higher interest rate (return to ￿nancial investment),
while entrepreneurs will locate their projects in the country with a lower production
cost. In the rest of this subsection, we discuss the special case in which only ￿nancial
capital ￿ ow is permitted, but no FDI.
The direction of ￿nancial ￿ows is determined by b r = (r￿ ￿ r)=r: If b r > 0;
￿nancial capital will ￿ ow from home to the foreign country. Otherwise, it will
￿ ow in the reverse direction. As we have shown in Corollary 1, if the country is
either relatively abundant in labor, more ￿nancially developed, or has less risk of
expropriation, its interest rate in the absence of international capital ￿ ow is higher.
In the equilibrium with free trade in goods, the endogenous variables in each
country are determined by equations (26), (27), (32), and (33), and their foreign-country
counterparts. The product market clearing condition now becomes (y1 + y￿
1)=(y2 + y￿
2) =
D(p): The equation (60) in the Appendix no longer holds but is not needed since
b p = 0 in the free trade equilibrium. All other proofs in the Appendix go through.
We again ignore the second order e⁄ect. Slightly abusing notations and substituting
24(65) into (56), we obtain
b r = ALb L ￿ AK b K + A￿b ￿ + A￿b ￿ (38)
where AL, AK; A￿; A￿ are all positive.7 We can summarize three polar cases with
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let there be free trade in goods, no barrier to international ￿nancial
capital ￿ows, but no FDI is permitted. If two countries are the same in terms
of ￿nancial development and expropriation risk but di⁄erent in endowment, then
￿nancial capital will ￿ow from capital-abundant country into labor-abundant country.
If the two countries have the same capital-labor ratio and identical expropriation
risk but di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial development, ￿nancial capital will ￿ow from the
country with a less developed ￿nancial system into the other one. If the two countries
have the same capital-labor ratio and levels of ￿nancial development, ￿nancial capital
will ￿ow from the country with a higher expropriation risk into the one with lower
expropriation risk.
6.3 Foreign Direct Investment
We now allow projects and entrepreneurs to move freely across countries. Rewrite































i represents the product price in free trade. It is easy to see @Uni=@w < 0;
@Uni=@r < 0; @Uni=@￿ > 0; and @Uni=@￿ > 0: We assume that entrepreneurs collect
the capital at home and utilize their home ￿nancial system even if they produce
abroad. We ￿rst consider the case of b ￿ = (￿￿ ￿ ￿)=￿ = 0. In this case domestic
7A detailed proof of equations (38) and (40) is available from authors upon request.
25entrepreneurs will have an outbound FDI if and only if w > w￿: Substituting (65)
into (55), we obtain
b w = ￿BLb L + BK b K ￿ B￿b ￿ (40)
where BL; BK; and B￿ are all positive. Thus w > w￿ if and only if the home country
is capital-abundant. That is, entrepreneurs from a capital-abundant country will
engage in outbound FDI to take the advantage of lower labor cost abroad.
Proposition 5 With free trade in goods, identical expropriation risk but prohibition
of international ￿nancial capital ￿ow, FDI will go from the capital-abundant country
to the labor-abundant one.
6.4 Complete Bypass of the Ine¢ cient Financial System
We now allow for both types of capital ￿ ows. Let both countries be diversi￿ed. We
start with the simplest case in which expropriation risk is identical across countries
and entrepreneurs are perfectly mobile. The unique equilibrium in this case is a
complete capital bypass circulation in which all capital owned by ￿nancial investors
(households) in the country with a less developed ￿nancial system leaves the country
in the form of ￿nancial capital out￿ow, but physical capital (and projects) reenters
the country in the form of FDI. The less developed ￿nancial system serves no capital
at all in the equilibrium.
The proof is straightforward: In the equilibrium, the interest rates and wage rates
must be equalized across two countries. Since entrepreneurs are perfectly mobile, if
entrepreneur n in a low ￿ country could be hired to manage a factory (project) in a
high ￿ country, she would like to move to the high ￿ country since @Uni=@￿ > 0. If
some managers had used the ￿nancial system of low ￿ country in the equilibrium,
the most e¢ cient manager among them would like to bring the capital she collected
and move to high ￿ country. That would reduce the wage rate in the low ￿ country
(hence making the low ￿ country more attractive to FDI from the high ￿ country),
26and crowd out the less e¢ cient managers in the high ￿ country whom would bring
her project to low ￿ country (hence raising the interest rate in the high ￿ country
in the process and making it more attractive to ￿nancial capital from the low ￿
country). Another wave of capital bypass circulation would occur until all ￿nancial
capital leaves the low ￿ country and enough FDI comes into the low ￿ country so
that factor prices are equalized between two countries in the equilibrium.
A modi￿ed graphical representation of an integrated world economy (Dixit and
Norman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985) can help to illustrate the equilibrium.
In Figure 5, O and O￿ represent the origins for home and foreign countries, respectively.
Vectors OY1 and OY2 represent the world employment of capital and labor in Sectors
1 and 2 in the equilibrium of the integrated world economy, respectively. Let
L = L￿ for simplicity. Suppose ￿ > ￿￿: Point H de￿nes the distribution of factor
endowments. Let home be capital-abundant so H is above the diagonal line of the
parallelogram OY2O￿Y1: International ￿nancial capital ￿ ow equalizes the interest
rates, while FDI equalizes the wage rates across two countries. For (w;r) to be
equal in the two countries, from equations (32) and (33), N1 and N￿
1 must be the
same since investors in both countries use the same ￿nancial system ￿. Thus the
factor usages of production in the equilibrium must be in the middle line of the
parallelogram, AA￿: That is, factor usages in Sector 1 represented by lengths of OA
and O￿A￿ must be the same for the two countries. Each country uses its own labor
endowment. Therefore, the intersection between AA￿ and LF; represented by point
E; indicates factor usages of production in the equilibrium. E happens to be in the
middle of the parallelogram since we assume L = L￿: OB and O￿B￿ represent the
factor usages in sector 2: All foreign capital ￿ ows into the home country in the form
of ￿nancial capital ￿ ow since ￿ > ￿￿; which is represented by FH: FDI, however,
￿ ows to the foreign country and is represented by EF: The circle FHEF represents
the capital bypass circulation. HE indicates the net capital out￿ ow of the home
country. The home country experiences a current account surplus as the capital
27account is negative.8 To summarize, we have:
Proposition 6 Let the expropriation risk be identical and entrepreneurs be perfectly
mobile across two countries with identical populations. In the unique equilibrium,
the less developed ￿nancial system is completely bypassed. All capital owned by the
country with the less developed ￿nancial system will leave the country in the form
of ￿nancial capital ￿ow. However, the country also experiences capital in￿ow in
the form of FDI. In equilibrium, the capital-abundant country incurs a net capital
out￿ow (and a trade surplus).
The complete capital bypass circulation equilibrium predicts the same direction
of net capital ￿ ow as a typical neoclassical one-sector model. The magnitude of
the interest rate di⁄erential (return to ￿nancial investment), however, is di⁄erent
between this model and a typical one-sector model. To see this, let b L = 0 for
simplicity. Substituting (65) into (56), we obtain:
b r = ￿￿1N
￿




where ￿1N = fc1N1=(1 + f): b K is no longer the only factor that determines interest
rate di⁄erential as in the Lucas paradox. The capital market imperfection which
is measured by the cost of e⁄ort in moral hazard problem c1; the entry cost of
entrepreneurs f, as well as the level of entrepreneurs heterogeneity represented by
the function form of cn1(:) all a⁄ect b r. In other words, even if the capital-labor ratio
is very di⁄erent between two countries, as long as f or c1 are su¢ ciently small, the
di⁄erence in the returns to ￿nancial investment between the two countries can be
small.9
8When entrepreneurs are not perfectly mobile and expropriation risk is not identical, a capital
abundant country with a developed ￿nancial system and low expropriation risk may experience a
net capital in￿ ow and therefore a current account de￿cit.
9Caselli and Freyrer (2005) computed that the rates of return to capital are very similar across
53 developing and rich countries for which they have the relevant data.
286.5 The Role of Expropriation Risk
The above discussion focuses on the role of ￿nancial sector e¢ ciency in determining
gross and net capital ￿ ows. The result that an ine¢ cient ￿nancial system would
be completely bypassed may be somewhat surprising and is derived under the
assumptions of identical expropriation risks across countries and perfectly mobile
entrepreneurs. We relax these assumptions in this section: the risk of expropriation
may be di⁄erent, and there is an additional ￿xed cost for entrepreneurs to move
their projects across national borders.
Let the additional ￿xed cost of FDI be d. In the equilibrium, interest rates
are equalized across countries by ￿nancial capital ￿ ow. As before, we assume that
entrepreneurs continue to use home ￿nancial services when they locate abroad. The
entrepreneur￿ s net return to internal capital when they produce at home is given
by expression (39) at domestic wage rate and expropriation risk, and denoted by
Uni(w;r;￿;￿): It becomes Ud
ni = Uni(w￿;r;￿￿;￿) ￿ d when they produce abroad.
Entrepreneur n produces abroad if and only if Uni ￿ Ud
ni: A corner solution occurs
in Sector 2. Suppressing the notations of r and ￿ for convenience, all ￿rms in Sector
2 produce at home if and only if U2(w;￿) > U2(w￿;￿￿) ￿ d. We assume that this
condition is satis￿ed so that home produces in both sectors (i.e., the countries are





11(w￿;￿￿) ￿ d (41)
This implies that UNd
11(w;￿) < UNd










n1 as a function of n must be steeper than Un1: As illustrated in Figure
2, Un1 and Ud
n1 intersect at Nd
1: Entrepreneurs in the interval of [1;Nd
1] choose
outward FDI in the foreign country, while entrepreneurs in the interval of (Nd
1;N1]
29choose to produce at home. In other words, the more e¢ cient ￿rms choose FDI and
the less e¢ cient ones produce at home. This result is similar to Helpman, Melitz,
and Yeaple (2004). Given the identical ￿xed cost d for all ￿rms, lower foreign labor
cost generates more pro￿t for larger ￿rms than for smaller ones.
Similar to expression (18), we derive the capital usage for a FDI ￿rm n, as
kd(n) = h(r;￿)=[h(r;￿) ￿ ￿￿R￿



































FDI ￿rms employ source-country capital but host-country labor by assumption.










Kn1(:)dn + K2(:)N2 = K + ￿f (45)
where ￿f is the amount of ￿nancial capital ￿ ow. ￿f > 0 represents ￿nancial capital



















2 = K￿ ￿ ￿f (47)
Similar to equations (32) and (33), the free entry conditions in the foreign country
30can be written as
￿￿a1w￿ +
1 + ￿￿2
2￿￿ [2(1 + r)￿]
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The equilibrium is characterized by 10 non-linear equations, (32), (33), (44),
(45), (46), (47), (48), (49), (50), and (41) with ten endogenous variables, pT; w;
r(= r￿); N1; N2; w￿; N￿
1; N￿
2; Nd
1; and ￿f. While a closed form solution is hard
to obtain, it is possible to compare wage rates across the countries and analyze the
e⁄ects of ￿nancial sector e¢ ciency and expropriation risk on capital ￿ ow.
From (33), it can be veri￿ed that @w=@￿ > 0 and @w=@￿ > 0: Recall that (33) is
derived from revenue sharing condition (22), and that the pay to an entrepreneur in
Sector 2 is ￿xed as fc2=(1 + f). As a better ￿nancial system reduces the investment
cost h(r;￿), it therefore raises the wage rate. A better property rights protection
(a lower expropriation risk) increases the expected revenue and therefore raises the
wage, too. Comparing (33) with (49), we have w > w￿ if ￿ > ￿￿ or ￿ > ￿￿:
It is worth emphasizing that in equilibrium, the relative wage across countries is
determined by the two institutional parameters, ￿ and ￿; but independent of the
initial endowment. A country with a low initial capital-to-labor ratio but better
property rights protection (higher ￿) or more e¢ cient ￿nancial system (higher ￿)
can attract more capital in the world market so that its labor is paid at a higher
wage in the equilibrium. We summarize the discussion by the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Suppose the two countries are diversi￿ed in the equilibrium. With
free mobility of capital, the wage rate is higher in the country with a more e¢ cient
31￿nancial system or better property rights protection, irrespective of the initial endowment.
While ￿nancial development and expropriation risk have similar e⁄ects on equilibrium
wage rate, they di⁄er in their e⁄ects on patterns of gross and net international capital
￿ ows. A less e¢ cient ￿nancial system, by depressing domestic return on ￿nancial
investment, leads to an out￿ ow of ￿nancial capital. As a result of this ￿nancial
out￿ ow, the wage rate becomes lower, which encourages inward FDI. In contrast,
worse property rights protection, by depressing domestic ￿nancial returns, leads to
an out￿ ow of ￿nancial capital, and at the same time, by depressing ￿rm pro￿ts, also
discourages inward FDI. Therefore, poor property rights protection may result in
￿nancial out￿ ow without a compensating in￿ ow of FDI.
This discussion suggests that for some economic questions, one should not lump
together di⁄erent types of institutions. Is there any evidence that poor ￿nancial
institutions and poor property rights protection give rise to di⁄erent patterns of
capital ￿ ows? Albuquerque (2003) and Wei (2005) examined the roles of these
institutional features in determining patterns of capital ￿ ow. They found evidence
that poor ￿nancial institutions are associated with a higher share of FDI in inward
capital ￿ ow.10 In contrast, Wei (2000 and 2005) found that poor property rights
protection or severe bureaucratic corruption clearly deters inward FDI. These pieces
of evidence are consistent with the prediction of this model.
Due to space constraint, we leave a welfare analysis of international capital ￿ ows
in the current model to an companion paper (Ju and Wei, 2006). We note here
that the welfare implication of capital ￿ ow in our model di⁄ers from the literature.
In most existing papers, removing barriers to capital ￿ ow improves welfare since
it improves e¢ ciency. Such a view relies on the assumption that the return to
investment equals the marginal product of physical capital. In our model, however,
￿nancial investors often gain at the expense of entrepreneurs. If the loss of the
10Both Huang (2003) and Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) hypothesized that the
large in￿ ows of FDI in China is a consequence of poor ￿nancial development of the country.
32entrepreneurs is large enough, ￿nancial capital out￿ ow can reduce welfare.
7 Conclusions
This paper has two objectives. First, we aim to provide a solution to two opposing
puzzles about international capital ￿ ows. Second, we provide a framework to discuss
systematically the roles of ￿nancial and property rights institutions in determining
patterns of gross and net capital ￿ ows.
Our model uses entrepreneur heterogeneity to partially restore the intuition
of one-sector models in a two-sector setting that the interest rate is lower in a
capital-abundant country. A revenue-sharing rule between ￿nancial investors and
entrepreneurs, together with marginal product of capital, determines the interest
rate. The quality of the ￿nancial system and expropriation risk play crucial roles
in the model. The interest rate is higher in the country with a better ￿nancial
system or a lower expropriation risk. Financial capital ￿ ows and FDI can move
in either the same or the opposite direction, and therefore form rich patterns of
gross capital ￿ ow. The equilibrium in a world of frictionless capital markets and
identical expropriation risks is unique: the less developed ￿nancial system of the
two is completely bypassed.
A better ￿nancial system or better property rights protection in a country
leads to a higher wage rate for the country in equilibrium. However, their e⁄ects
on patterns of cross-border capital ￿ ow are di⁄erent. A lower level of ￿nancial
development results in a lower interest rate, which generates an out￿ ow of ￿nancial
capital. As a result, wages becomes lower, which attracts more FDI than otherwise.
Higher expropriation risk, on the other hand, results in lower pro￿t, leading to less
FDI (and out￿ ow of ￿nancial capital).
The current model is static; extending it to a dynamic analysis will be a fruitful
direction for future research. Taking the model to the data so that patterns of gross
33and net capital ￿ ow can be linked to di⁄erent institutional variables is also high on
our agenda.
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8 Appendix A: Existing Solutions to the Paradoxes in
the Literature
In this Appendix, we ￿rst propose and prove a ￿chain rule of factor price equalization,￿
and then dissect extant solutions to the Lucas paradox and explanations for why
FPE may not hold.
36Lemma 2 Let the number of factors be m in a standard neoclassical model. For
any two countries, if they can be linked by a sequence of country pairs, and the
countries in each pair produce a common set of m products, then the factor prices
are equalized among all these countries in a free-trade world, even in the absence of
international factor movement.
Proof: Let m ￿ n: Suppose that countries can always be ranked in a way
so that at least m products are commonly produced by a pair of neighboring




m : Neighboring countries may specialize in the rest of n ￿ m
products. Note that we only require neighboring countries to produce a common set
of m products. They do not have to trade directly with each other. Furthermore,
non-neighboring countries may specialize in di⁄erent sets of products. For countries













m ) for i = 1;￿￿￿ ;m (52)
m equations in (51) determine m factor prices wh
1;￿￿￿wh
m for country h, while m
equations in (52) determine m factor prices wh+1
1 ;￿￿￿wh+1
m for country h+1: Because
the technology is assumed to be identical across countries, and product prices are
equalized under free trade, factor prices in these two countries must be the same. By
the same logic, factor prices in countries h+1 and h+2 must be equalized. Extending
the logic, factor prices in all countries are equalized. As an illustration, consider
a world with two factors, labor and land. Factor returns in the United States and
India can be equalized even if the two countries do not trade each other, and do not
produce any product in common. All that is needed is for the United States and
India to be linked by a sequence of country pairs, with enough common products
within each pair. For example, the United States and Greece may both produce
apples and apricots, Greece and Thailand may both produce beer and bottles, and
Thailand and India may both produce cotton and carriages. Free trade in goods
would ensure factor price equalization between the United States and India.
Lucas (1990) himself provided three explanations for the puzzle of too small
capital ￿ ows. The ￿rst is an e⁄ective labor di⁄erentiation: if each U.S. worker is ￿ve
times as productive as an Indian, holding other things constant, then the predicted
return to capital in India became 5 rather than 58 times that in the United States.
We can show that this intuition does not survive a generalization from a one-sector to
a two-sector model. Let production function be yi = fi(ELi;Ki) where E represents
labor productivity. It can be shown that the zero pro￿t conditions in a two goods,


















and r are determined
by (p1;p2). For given product prices, the increase in labor productivity E will





37to capital, r; is not a⁄ected by the increase in E: That is, in the two-sector model, if
the U.S. worker is 5 times more productive than the Indian workers, then the wage
rate in the United States is exactly 5 times higher than in India. The return to
capital, however, is not a⁄ected by the change in labor productivity.
Lucas￿second explanation is missing factor(s). If human capital is to be included
as another factor, then the predicted return to capital in India would be further
reduced from 5 to 1:04 times than that in the United States. This argument,
however, does not survive a generalization to a multiple-sector, three-factor model.
Using our chain rule of factor price equalization, the returns to the three factors
(capital, labor, and human capital) are equalized across countries as long as at least
three common products are produced by a sequence of country pairs. Free trade in
goods substitutes for factor ￿ ow. The abundance of human capital in the United
States does not a⁄ect the return to capital, but simply changes the composition of
output.
Lucas￿third explanation, downplayed by him but emphasized by Reinhart and
Rogo⁄ (2004), is sovereign risk. The risk of sovereign default prevents capital from
￿ owing from rich to poor countries. In a two-factor, two-sector model, however, free
trade in goods has already led to equal return to capital across countries. There is
no room for sovereign risk to further a⁄ect the return to capital.
What about reasons for why FPE does not hold? Consider ￿rst costs of goods
trade. Trade costs do break FPE but exacerbate the Lucas paradox. As pointed
out by Mundell (1957), when the trade costs drive a wedge between the prices of
the same good in two countries, it is impossible for the interest rates in the two
countries to be equalized as long as there is trade in goods. Capital ￿ ows would
completely eliminate goods trade.11
A popular explanation for both paradoxes is cross-country di⁄erential in total
factor productivity (TFP), of which di⁄erence in legal institutions is a special case.
If TFP is di⁄erent, the return to factors is, of course, di⁄erent across countries. The
TFP explanation, however, may not predict, the direction of capital ￿ ows. Let the
TFP in foreign country be higher in the two-goods, two-factors, and two-countries
model and variables in the foreign country be denoted by a superscript ￿￿￿ . That
is,
p￿
1 = B1c1(w￿;r￿) and p￿
2 = B2c2(w￿;r￿) (53)
and Bi < 1: Let sector 1 be labor-intensive. Using the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,
higher TFP (B1 < 1) in sector 1 increases w￿ but reduces r￿; while higher TFP in
sector 2 increases r￿ but reduces w￿: Unless we know exactly the magnitudes of TFP
in all sectors, the return to capital in the more technologically advanced country can
be either higher or lower. Di⁄erences in institutions may have asymmetric e⁄ects
on productivity for di⁄erent sectors. Unless a structural model of institution is
developed, as we do in this paper, reduced form TFP may be too general to predict
the direction of capital ￿ ow.
11In an in￿ uential paper by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(2000), trade costs are used to explain six major
puzzles in international macroeconomics other than Lucas paradox.
38Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that no equilibrium exists in the HOS
model once a di⁄erence in technology and free capital ￿ ows are allowed, unless in
knife-edge or specialization cases. We can prove this by contradiction. If free trade
in goods leads to pi = p￿
i; then (2) and (53) imply that r 6= r￿ in most cases, and
so capital must ￿ ow. But if free capital ￿ ows lead to r = r￿; then (2) and (53)
imply that pi 6= p￿
i; and so the goods market would be out of equilibrium. Thus, no
equilibrium exists in general.12
When countries are fully specialized, probably due to substantial di⁄erences in
endowments, factor returns will be di⁄erent. The full specialization assumption,
however, requires that the condition we state in the above ￿chain rule of FPE￿
is violated. That is, no sequence of country pairs connected by common sets of
products exist, which is certainly a matter subject to empirical investigation.
9 Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions
1. Proof of Proposition 1
Totally di⁄erentiating equations (32) and (33), we obtain
￿1w b w + ￿1rb r = ￿1￿b ￿ + ￿1￿b ￿ + ￿1pb p ￿ ￿1N b N1
￿2w b w + ￿2rb r = ￿2￿b ￿ + ￿2￿b ￿ (54)
where b w = dw=w denotes the percentage change in wage rate and likewise for































, and ￿i￿ = ￿Ri; while ￿1p = p￿G1(a1;1)
and ￿1N = fc1N1=(1 + f): We can solve for the percentage change in factor prices




























where j￿j = ￿1w￿2r ￿￿1r￿2w < 0 if sector 1 is capital intensive than sector 2: Using
(22), we have




Thus, ￿(R1 ￿ R2) > 0 if and only if c1N1 ￿ c2 > 0, which also implies that a1R2 ￿
a2R1 < a1 (R2 ￿ R1) < 0: Then results in Proposition 1 are immediately seen from
12We thank Arvind Panagariya for pointing this out.
39expressions (55) and (56).
2. Proof of Proposition 2
Using (28), we have









These solutions for b aij(j = L;K) can then be substituted into equation (35) to
obtain


















Let j￿j denote the determinant of the 2￿2 matrix on the left hand side of the above
system. It is immediately seen that j￿j < 0 if and only if a1 < a2:
Totally di⁄erentiating equation (31), we obtain
￿N b N1 ￿ b N2 = ￿￿Db p (60)




(1 + f ￿ fN1)ln[N1=(1 + f ￿ fN1)]
(61)


















Then substituting the above expression into equations (58) and (59), we obtain
(￿1L ￿ ￿1) b N1 + (￿2L + ￿2) b N2 = b L ￿ ￿￿b ￿
(￿1K ￿ ￿1) b N1 + (￿2K + ￿2) b N2 = b K ￿ ￿￿b ￿ (63)
where
￿1 = ￿









￿1, ￿2; and ￿￿ are positive. Let j￿j denote the determinant of the 2 ￿ 2 matrix
40on the left hand side of (63). We assume a modi￿ed condition for non-reversal of
factor intensity that j￿j and j￿j have the same sign, which implies that j￿j < 0: The
condition ensures that sector 1 is capital intensive both before and after changes
in factor endowments, the level of ￿nancial development, and expropriation risk.
Solving for b N1 gives
b N1 =
(￿2K + ￿2) b L ￿ (￿2L + ￿2) b K + ￿￿ (￿2L ￿ ￿2K)b ￿
j￿j
b N2 =
(￿1L ￿ ￿1) b K ￿ (￿1K ￿ ￿1) b L + ￿￿ (￿1K ￿ ￿1L)b ￿
j￿j
(65)
Using the fact that ￿1L ￿ ￿1K = ￿N (￿2K ￿ ￿2L); we have j￿j = ￿N (￿2K ￿ ￿2L):
Thus, ￿2L ￿ ￿2K > 0 and ￿1K ￿ ￿1L > 0: So we have b N1 > 0 if b K > 0, b L = 0, and
b N1 < 0; b N2 < 0 if b ￿ > 0:






b p = b L ￿ b K (66)
b p < 0 when b K ￿ b L > 0. Note that both b ￿ and b ￿ have no e⁄ect on b p.
To study the e⁄ect of the increase in ￿ on y1; we take the logarithm and total
di⁄erentiate (29) and obtain
b y1 = b ￿ +
r
1 + r
b r + ￿N b N1 (67)
Substituting (56) and (65) into the above expression with some computations we
have
b y1 = b ￿ ￿
r￿2w￿1N￿￿




￿N (1 + ￿2) ￿ ￿1
b ￿ + 2￿￿b ￿ > b ￿ > 0
Similarly we have b y2 > b ￿ > 0:
41  
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3.  Table of Notations 
Notations   Definitions 
i p   price of good i 
T p   equilibrium price under free trade 
w  wage rate 
r   interest rate 
λ   control of expropriation risk 
θ   level of financial development 
i R   return to a unit of period 1 investment if the project succeeds 
E
ni R   entrepreneur’s share in capital revenue if the project succeeds 
K   capital endowment of the country 
L  labor endowment of the country 
1
ni K   period 1 investment managed by entrepreneur n  
1 X
ni K   external capital that entrepreneur raises at date 1 
ni K   the total amount of capital managed by entrepreneur n  
d κ   capital usage for all FDI firms 
f κ   amount of financial capital flow 
( )
1 1, i i i K L G   production function in sector i at period 1 
i a   labor-capital ratio in sector i 
1
i y   output of the project in sector i if the project succeeds 
i y   expected (or the realized) output in sector i 
d y1   expected output of all FDI firms 
i N   number of entrepreneurs in sector i 
d N1   number of FDI entrepreneurs in sector 1 
i N ˆ   i i N dN = , and likewise for all other variables 
i ρ   liquidity shock in sector i 
() ρ i F   distribution function of liquidity shock in sector i 
() ρ i f   density function of liquidity shock in sector i 
1
i ρ   i R λ =  
0
ni ρ   ( )
E
ni i R R − =λ
opt ρ   optimal cutoff of the liquidity shock 
() . h   expected unit cost of total investment 
() . ni U   firm’s net return to internal capital 
() . ni c   entrepreneur  s n'  cost of effort 
f   fixed cost to become an entrepreneur 
() . D   relative demand 
j i φ   fraction of factor j used in sector i 
( ) i ni ρ µ   state-contingent continuation policy 
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